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I. Introduction
This paper argues that food insecurity in Solomon Islands is a form of 
structural violence that can be traced to pervasive iterations of colonialism 
expressed through globalisation. It combines empirical research conducted 
in Marovo Lagoon with a survey of regionally and thematically pertinent 
literature to establish causal links between food insecurity and the impact of 
intervention by outside agents. It contrasts the situation of Honiara’s urban poor 
with the relatively abundant self-reliant food economies on Nggatokae(1) Island, 
Marovo Lagoon, where, despite the near absence of the state and state welfare, 
customary law and traditional systems of entitlements ensure no one is denied 
access to food or essential resources.
II. Food (In)security
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) states that Solomon Islands “with one 
of the fastest-growing populations in the world, per capita income is the second 
lowest in the region… almost 23% of the population faces difficulty meeting 
basic food and essential non-food needs” (ADB, 2009). The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)(2) meanwhile places the state among the ‘Least Developed 
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Countries’ (LDCs) while the 2011 UN Human Development Report (HDR) 
ranks it 141st out of 187 states (down from 123rd in 2010) in the ‘Low Human 
Development’ category. Symptoms of economic fragility include: 13% of infants 
with a low birthweight,(3) 12% of under-fives moderate to severely underweight, 
and 32.8 % of the population under age five suffering from stunting and 11.5% 
suffering from wasting (HDR Table 7 2011, p. 152). Empirical conditions behind 
these figures include young mothers and children begging in front of foreign 
owned banks in Honiara, while others eke out a fragile living scavenging in the 
city dump. (Solomon Star, November 11, 2010) Meanwhile squatter settlements, 
such as Burns Creek, home to some 2000+ people, rely on just two water taps 
(Braithwaite, Dinnen, Allen, Braithwaite, Charlesworth, 2010, p. 92). These 
preventable conditions condemn afflicted children to physical and cognitive 
impairment, reducing their quality of life and their communities’ social and 
economic potential.
The 2010 Pacific Food Summit adopted the 1996 Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) definition of food security, which “exists when all people, 
at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (Towards a Food Secure Pacific, 2010, p. 3). By this measure Solomon 
Islands is failing to ensure food security for its most vulnerable citizens. 
Traditionally islanders “draw most of their needs for food, water, security, 
recovery from natural and human disasters … from village, church and kinship-
based social systems that are little buttressed by national and international 
markets or by state”. Few “go without food and shelter for the want of state 
welfare” with fewer falling “through gaps… compared with the numbers that 
fall through gaps in western state-based welfare systems” (Braithwaite et al. p. 
13). Hviding, however, observes that “urbanisation dynamics … are making all 
this less true” (Hviding, 1996, p. 77).
Retrieved November 15, 2012 from www.unicef.org/infobycountry/solomonislands_statistics.
html
(3)
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III. Cursed in a Land of Plenty?
The Solomon archipelago has, for generations, attracted outsiders seeking 
access to its rich resources. “Decades before the nation started its downward 
slide, multinational corporations began appearing on the scene, hungry for the 
Solomon Islands’ large stocks of standing rainforest timber, valuable migratory 
tuna fisheries, and undeveloped gold deposits” (Hviding, 2003, p. 542). 
Concessions granted to Lever Brothers by British Protectorate authorities helped 
lay the foundation for Unilever’s global empire.(4)
The islands continue to be a target for “multinational resource hunters - 
the only difference being that these hunters today are mainly Asian, no longer 
European, in origin” (Hviding, 2003, p. 541).
‘Resource frontier’ (Jorgenson 2006) is a political ecology term that 
describes  geographical and conceptual spaces on the periphery of the global 
economic system where large-scale resource extraction takes place, typically 
at the lowest possible cost, with little regard for people or their natural and 
social capital. These local-global nexuses are characterised by extreme power 
imbalances between local and external actors. Galtung cites “tremendous 
inequality, within and between nations… as one of the major forms of structural 
violence”. (Galtung, 1971, p. 43) A compelling hypothesis if we consider the 
assertion of authors such as Sodhi that “the people of the Solomon Islands are 
no better off today than they were at independence… (and) because of the civic 
violence that has resulted from stagnation, many are in fact worse off” (Sodhi 
2008, p. 17-18). 
Ross suggests “strong evidence that states with abundant resource wealth 
perform less well than their resource-poor counterparts” but concedes “there 
is little agreement on why this occurs” (Ross, 1999, p. 297). Called alternately 
the ‘paradox of plenty’ by Karl (1997) and the ‘resource curse’ by Auty (1993) 
and Ross (1999) this theory can be readily applied to Solomon Islands. Collier 
Retrieved November 15, 2012 from www.unilever.com/aboutus/ourhistory/1900s/(4)
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meanwhile describes ‘traps’ (of conflict, natural resource dependency and bad 
government) that are equally though controversially applicable (Collier, 2006, p. 
15). Easterly for his part disputes Collier’s assertion that developing states “need 
the West to rescue them” (Easterly, 2007, p. 1476). This is understandable. Few 
terms come more encumbered with colonial baggage than “development”:
Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the 
ʻnativesʼ will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it 
reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be 
reformed by keeping alive the premiss of the Third World as different 
and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished 
European (Escobar 1995 in Bawtree & Rahnema eds. 1997, p. 93).
Easterly takes particular umbrage at Collier’s prescription that “security 
in postconflict societies will normally require an external military presence” 
(Collier, 2007, p. 133). This is a notion Easterly excoriates: “Economists should 
not be allowed to play games with statistics, much less with guns” (Easterly, 
2007, p. 1476). 
Operation ‘Helpem Fren’ (helping friends), the Australian led Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), is one such armed 
intervention that brought a Pax Australis (some would argue Pax Pacifica) 
and effectively ended the 1998-2003 tensions, a period marked by violence, 
lawlessness and the near complete collapse of state institutions. Food security, 
while not explicit, is arguably implicit in RAMSI’s mandate: 
• Ensure the safety and security of Solomon Islands.
• Repair and reform the machinery of government, improve government 
accountability and improve the delivery of services in urban and provincial 
areas. 
• Improve economic governance and strengthen the government’s financial 
systems. 
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• Help rebuild the economy and encourage sustainable broad-based growth. 
• Build strong and peaceful communities.(5)
Despite RAMSI’s successes food security remains fragile and moreover 
RAMSI’s food policies have been a source of local irritation with “RAMSI 
military and police importing all their food from Australia instead of buying 
fresh fish and fruit from local markets” (Braithwaite et al. 2010, p. 137). At the 
same time RAMSI’s well-paid expatriates’ demands for goods and services are 
blamed for exacerbating inequalities. Moore sums up the disconnect between 
RAMSI and the local populace:
It is difficult for foreign RAMSI staff in the public service, secure in 
their nice homes with nice views and driving air-conditioned four-wheel 
drive vehicles, to appreciate the full extent of Honiara’s urban poverty 
and overcrowding of accommodation. Urban Solomon Islanders, even in 
relatively affluent Honiara suburbs like Vura or White River, often share 
their small homes with 20 to 30 adults and children, and learn to live with 
the spasmodic water and electricity supply. There is often not enough 
food to last until the next payday, and they suffer debilitating bouts of 
malaria. Public service reforms need to address much more than the simple 
abstractions of efficiency and probity (Moore 2005, p. 71-72).
Dobell meanwhile tallies the mounting costs largely borne by Australian 
taxpayers:
The year before RAMSI, Australia's aid commitment to Solomon Islands 
was $33 million.(6) In 2003-04, aid jumped to $140 million, then $180 
million in 2004-05, $234 million in 2005-06, and the budget for… 2007 is 
(5)
(6)
www.ramsi.org/about/what-is-ramsi.html (accessed June 25, 2012)
Dobell does not specify currency but given that these figures appear in an Australian 
publication this paper assumes they are Australian dollars.
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$223 million (Dobell, 2007, p. 4). 
Australian assistance in 2012-2013 is projected to reach AU $239.4(7) 
million. This includes ODA totalling $135.1 million and an additional $104.3m 
expensed “via other government departments including the Australian Federal 
Police’s support to the RAMSI Participating Police Force”. (AusAID)
RAMSI is but one element, albeit a major one, in a petri dish of 
interventions. Braithwaite et al. claim Solomon Islands receives “higher levels of 
foreign aid support than can be found almost anywhere in the world” (Braithwaite 
et al. 2010, p. 146) while Anderson estimates that ODA represented 67% of 
GDP in 2005 (Anderson, 2008, p. 13) yet “Solomon Islanders in the past decade 
have been considerably worse off economically than they were in the 1970s”. 
(Braithwaite et al. 2010, p. 146)  Sodhi posits this reason:
Much of the aid for the Solomon Islands is “boomerang” funding. It flows 
to expatriates who repatriate most of their incomes to their home countries. 
Aid continues to pay high expatriate salaries in the Solomon Islands because 
the past four years have not been used to teach Solomon Islanders to run 
their own country (Sodhi, 2008, p. 16).
As a key donor Australia often bears the brunt of criticism for failures of 
external assistance to meaningfully reduce food insecurity. A balanced analysis, 
however, must also consider the role of ODA and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) from other OECD actors that include the USA, the European Commission, 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and New Zealand AID in 
addition to major non-OECD actors such as Taiwan, China and Malaysia.(8)
With regards to FDI Allen et al. argue that the liquidation of forest resources 
(7)
(8)
Retrieved November 15, 2012 from www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/solomon-islands/
Pages/default.aspx
For discussions of shifting strategic and economic paradigms due to increasing Asian influence 
and controversial aid flows see Dobell (2007) and Crocombe (2007).
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has failed to deliver economic wellbeing because: “The industry is controlled by 
overseas (mainly Asian) companies, and is based on the export of round logs. 
Almost no milling, value adding, replanting or site rehabilitation is carried out” 
(Allen et al. 2006, p. 132, citing Bennett, 2000). This is not a model conducive 
to long-term economic health and as such represents failures of governance and 
blatant exploitation by timber companies.
IV. Kastom Entitlements in a Traditional Food Economy
The Biche butubutu (tribe) holds customary title to a rugged 13 km2 
puava on the exposed southern ‘weather coast’ of Nggatokae Island where 
approximately 150 inhabitants make their living through mixed agroforestry 
combined with subsistence fishing employing a range of specifically adapted 
techniques.  The village has long been recognised “as an important place of 
kastom” where Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) and corresponding 
ways of life are preserved. (Hviding, 1996, p. 414) Indeed Biche’s puava 
provides an example of what the FAO classifies as a Globally Important 
Agricultural Heritage System (GIAHS) defined as “remarkable land use 
systems and landscapes, which are rich in globally significant biological 
diversity evolving from the co-adaptation of a community with its environment 
and its needs and aspirations for sustainable development” (FAO, 2008). 
Despite resembling wild forest conceptualised as ‘virgin rainforest’ by foreign 
conservationists, the forests of Marovo are in fact an intricate tapestry of 
interconnected agricultural and aboricultural zones “transformed by many 
generations into human-influenced eco-systems of mature secondary forest with 
a conspicuous presence of directly useful trees” (Hviding 1996, p. 262; Hviding, 
2003, p. 549). 
Significantly Biche is one of few communities to resist coercive pressure 
by logging companies seeking access to their substantial timber reserves (Duke 
et al. 2007, p. 121). Instead they have signed an agreement with Australian and 
US based organisations in an effort to leverage their “rich cultural heritage” and 
“outstanding geographic and archaeological significance” (Duke et al. 2007, 
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p. 121) to create a functional conservation economy based on eco-tourism and 
the production of traditional arts such as kato (stone mortar and pestles) and 
wood carvings. Optimistic long-term plans include revenue from payment 
for ‘ecosystem services’(9) schemes such as the UN’s REDD+(10) (Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). It remains to be seen 
whether these will generate sufficient income required to ensure food security. 
In the meantime, in contrast to Honiara, customary law ensures no one is 
denied access to food or other essentials. Gardening, food gathering, timber 
cutting and bush material collection are sanctioned by inherited entitlements (and 
responsibilities) encoded within binary concepts of nginira and hinoho. People 
born into the butubutu inherit nginira and hinoho from both parents, though 
matrilineal inheritance carries greater weight (Hviding, 1996, p. 373). Nginira 
translates as “power to speak directly” while hinoho is an entitlement of personal 
use (Kinch, Mesia, Kere, Manioli, and Bulehite 2006, p. 47). Descendants of 
the Tinoni pa Goana (bush people) typically hold customary title to land and 
land-based resources while descendants of Tinoni pa Sera (saltwater people) 
typically control reefs and constituent marine resources though generations of 
inter-marriage mean some possess overlapping rights to both. Historically these 
two distinct communities traded resources from their respective zones: fish and 
coconuts from the coast, taro and bush medicines from the interior. They now 
cohabit coastal villages but remain keenly aware of their respective nginira and 
hinoho. Outsiders who marry into a butubutu gain limited hinoho but no nginira. 
In the marine context hinoho permits subsistence fishing but not commercial e.g. 
bêche-de-mer harvesting (Duke et al. 2007, p. 101). Terrestrial hinoho permits 
subsistence farming or food gathering but no say in land use decisions. 
Foreign demand for high commercial value resources is stressing these 
systems: “Increasingly today, people appear to be ‘creatively’ representing their 
lineage histories in order to gain access to key fishing grounds or to claim rights 
to royalties, resulting in increased intra-community tensions” (Duke et al. 2007, 
(9)
(10)
See “Payment for ecosystem services” (World Bank, 2010, p. 127)
http://www.cbd.int/forest/redd-plus (accessed June 25, 2012)
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p. 101). 
V. Agrobiodiversity and Resilience
It is uncertain when taro cultivation or indeed agriculture was first practiced 
on Nggatokae but biochemical analysis of stone artefacts from the northern 
Solomon Islands (part of contemporary Papua New Guinea) have revealed taro 
starch residues that Loy et al. (1992) have dated to 28,000 years BP. Bowdler 
meanwhile acknowledges that while “it is still open to argument as to whether 
taro might… have been brought by humans… (the presence of taro starch 
grains) do hint at… deliberate human dispersal” to which she concedes “we 
may be dealing with extremely sophisticated environmental managers, which 
is not necessarily to call them ‘agriculturalists” (Bowdler, 1997, p. 9). What is 
certain is the historical importance of taro, not only to Nggatokae, but across 
the Solomon Islands. Jansen et al. note that “in pre-Christian times, and even 
up to World War II, taro was the main root crop across the country, and taro 
cultivation - embedded in culture and spiritual beliefs - was the main activity of 
rural life” (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 54). Biche residents(11) cite a series of powerful 
earthquakes in the 1930s that altered the hydrology, and thus the viability, of 
their ruta terraces. This was followed by successive crop failures caused in part 
by the taro beetle, leaf blight and alomae and bobone viruses that pushed this 
ancient staple to the margins, both on Nggatokae, and across the archipelago. 
The result is taro is now relegated to the periphery across Solomon Islands but in 
the case of Nggatokae remains a key ingredient in traditional delicacies such as 
masimasi, a festive dish made of layers of taro roots, taro leaves and Canarium 
nuts baked in stone motu ovens. Taro is therefore still planted along the edges of 
gardens where cassava and sweet potatoes dominate.
Despite shifting paradigms agrobiodiversity(12) remains “very high, both 
(11)
(12)
Oral history related in particular by guide and local historian Pattenson Pudi of Biche village 
August, 2010.
For a detailed inventory see Hviding (2005) ‘Reef and Rainforest: An Environmental 
Encyclopedia of Marovo Lagoon’
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in terms of mixtures of species within farming systems and at the cultivar 
level within each species” (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 5-6). Islanders display a keen 
awareness of the importance of diversity as a means to increase productivity 
and build resilience to disease and weather shocks. “Women are primarily the 
collectors and maintainers of crop diversity and are continually collecting, 
screening and exchanging germ plasm to build up a range of cultivars suitable 
to their particular garden environments (i.e. soils and local microclimates), as 
well as to their tastes and needs” Significantly “individuals, families, clans and 
tribes may have rare, locally specific cultivars that have been maintained for 
generations” (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 5-6).
The two species of Canarium nuts present on Nggatokae: Canarium indicum 
and Canarium salomonense (ngoete and maria in Jinama Ulusaghe or ngali in 
Solomon Islands Pijin) remain the single most important source of plant protein. 
These are cultivated in ancestral groves of several hundred-year old specimens 
(Hviding, 1996, p. 58). Evidence of food use of Canarium dates to the early 
Holocene at 10,000 BP (Spriggs and Wickler, 1992). Spriggs notes meanwhile 
that “the transfer of Canarium required considerable human intervention” thus 
“must have been deliberately planted, tended, and harvested” (Spriggs, 2000, p. 
297). 
In addition to economic significance, Canarium harvests also serve an 
important temporal function. The Jinama Ulusaghe word for year, buruburu, 
is derived from buruburuani (nut grove) and refers to the interval between 
harvests. Hviding calls these ancestral groves “cultural and social markers” 
(Hviding 1996, p. 262) that serve an important genealogical function whereby 
people trace kinship through harvest entitlements to specific trees obtained 
through matrilineal descent. 
Nutritional, economic and cultural value aside, it is Canarium’s effectiveness 
as an arthritis treatment that has made it the subject of a controversial patent. In 
2002 the US Patent and Trademark Office granted Australian entrepreneur Peter 
Hull patent #6,395,313, 28 May 2002 on Canarium spp. (Kariyawasam, 2008, 
p. 83; Te Pareake Mead et al. 1997, p. 41) an act Sanderson & Sherman of the 
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Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture branded: “the latest in 
a string of disputes where traditional remedies, foodstuffs or knowledge have 
been patented by non-traditional parties” (Sanderson & Sherman, 2004, p. 22). 
Biopiracy is but one of a growing number of external threats to the agricultural 
heritage and food security of Solomon Islanders. 
VI. Globalising Diets
When Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Missionaries established their first 
mission at Viru Harbour on New Georgia Island in 1914 it marked the beginning 
of a gradual transformation of island diets. The SDA introduced Old Testament 
food laws (Leviticus 11:1-47) whereby adherents “are prohibited from eating 
a large proportion of locally available food resources, notably shellfish, turtles, 
crustaceans, and rely almost exclusively on finfish for the animal protein 
component of their diet, and exploit a much narrower resource base than do 
villagers of other denominations”. (Hviding, 1996, p. 69)  This contrast is readily 
apparent when one compares the contemporary diet of predominantly SDA 
Nggatokae Island, in particular Biche Village, with that of the predominantly 
United Church (Methodist) Village of Zaira, situated on the weather coast of 
neighbouring Vangunu Island. 
The contrast is particularly extreme during bad weather when SDA 
households on Nggatokae typically opt for store bought foods “whereas among 
Methodist and Christian Fellowship villagers… women’s gathering of shellfish 
from mangroves and (to a lesser degree) men’s hunting of feral pig alleviate the 
need for a steady supply of fresh fish” (Hviding, 1996, p. 69). 
“Imported rice, bread and noodles are now the leading Pacific staples, not 
local taro and yam” (Hughes & Lawrence, 2005, p. 300). This is increasingly 
true even in remote villages such as Biche. The practical appeal is undeniable, 
in particular for women who must make the long trek over steep, rough paths 
to the chigo pa goana, small children in tow. Convenience foods represent a 
substantial labour saving, albeit a nutrition poor one:
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The current, noncommunicable disease health issues facing the country 
are almost all related to increased consumption of imported processed 
foods … These foods are replacing the traditional healthy and balanced 
meals, causing a huge cost to the country in terms of rising diabetes, heart 
disease and infant malnutrition (which is as high as 20 – 30% in most 
provinces although data are poor) (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 9).
Convenience aside, imported foods are increasingly regarded as high-
status, “while fresh garden foods are associated with low status and local 
mindset” (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 48). A phenomenon that calls to mind Nandy’s 
characterisation of the “second form of colonization,” which “colonizes minds 
in addition to bodies and… releases forces within the colonized societies to alter 
their cultural priorities once for all” (Nandy, 1997, p. 170). 
VII. Rice and the Politicisation of Food Security
Despite their geographical and cultural distance from the rice fields of Asia, 
Solomon Islanders now rank among the largest consumers of rice in the Pacific, 
eating an average of 100 kg per person per year (National Rice Sector Policy 
2010-2015, p. 1). This is not a new phenomenon. Jourdan notes that rice was 
already selling “well in Roviana stores in 1896”, its early popularity attributed 
to the fact that “it travelled well, kept well in storage for long periods, cooked 
quickly and was filling.” (Jourdan, 2010, p. 267)
Despite its popularity rice remains a controversial and at times problematic 
staple. Importer Solrais has “monopolized the industry for almost two decades 
resulting in ever increasing price hikes and falling product quality” (National 
Rice Sector Policy 2010-2015, p. 2). In June 2010 Honiara’s Chief Health 
Inspector warned of “inferior quality rice… that has a bad odor… unusual 
color and is lumpy”. (Solomon Times. June 29, 2010)(13) Meanwhile moves 
(13) For a discussion of the contentious issue of dumping health-damaging low-quality foods in the 
Pacific SIDS by exporting countries see Hughes and Lawrence (2005, p. 299)
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“away from monopolistic policies in food imports… (and) opening up of the 
rice import market has driven down the price,” resulting in better affordability 
(Pacific Islands Trade & Invest, June 17, 2011). Grayson, however, warns of an 
economic downside to importing a key staple:
It is one of the ways by which even isolated rural communities interact with 
the cash economy. As a consequence, the earning of income to buy rice has 
become a food security strategy. This is problematic, given the volatility of 
commodity prices and currency fluctuations (Grayson, 2002, p. 18). 
Indeed Solomon Islands must compete with larger, more economically 
robust importers. In 2011 Indonesia’s Badan Urusan Logistik stunned 
commodity markets when it purchased 820,000 tons of rice from Thai exporters, 
four times more than anticipated. The deal “automatically pushed domestic 
milled rice higher” (Jakarta Globe, January 27, 2011) due to a spike in demand 
blamed on extreme weather events (Reuters, Feb 9, 2011).
Vulnerabilities of distance, market conditions and currency fluctuations 
have spurred repeated calls to establish a domestic rice industry. Attempts 
predate independence. In the 1970s British Company BSA Ltd. introduced a 
mechanized, energy intensive growing system, employing calendar-based aerial 
applications of fertilizers and pesticides to Central Guadalcanal. The venture 
ultimately failed in 1986 due to extreme insect infestation (rice brown plant 
hopper), and weather disturbances (National Rice Sector Policy 2010-2015, p. 
2). Attempts persevere despite consistent failures. JICA (2010, p. 24) continues 
to promote commercial rice production as a priority and a visiting “specialist 
from the Japan Association of Agriculture and Forestry” urged Solomon Islands 
to “seriously go into large commercial rice farming because it would benefit the 
country and save import costs in the long run” (Solomon Star, August 11, 2010). 
If only this were so:
Generally, most farmers give up growing rice after a few crops or, at most, 
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after two or three years, because the return to labour is poor compared with 
sweet potato, and the crop has a higher risk because it is susceptible to pests, 
and is expensive to manage (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 57).
Rice farming is also heavily subsidised by Taiwan and promoted by the 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock. Bennett posits a geopolitical, not 
domestic food security, agenda: “Taiwan, in order to hold Solomons’ (sic) vote 
for its status as the Republic of China in the international arena, seems bent on 
underwriting any scheme, no matter how questionable” (Bennett, 2002, p. 10). 
Jansen et al. concur: “Rice is a political crop with many associated government 
policies and statements about replacing rice imports. If the resources invested 
in promoting and subsidising rice were properly considered and accounted for, 
support for rice production would probably be abandoned” (Jansen et al. 2006, 
p. 57). Dry rice cultivation on the other hand shows some promise as “evidenced 
by small-scale plots of upland rice grown in Bougainville to provide occasional 
variation to a root crop diet” (Jansen et al. 2006, p. 57). In Solomon Islands 
“upland rice is now being experimented with in village gardens” and “by an 
organic urban market gardener” in Honiara (Grayson, 2006, p. 20) suggesting a 
potentially lucrative crop for the expatriate market.
VIII. Vulnerabilities
Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2 stood at 396.78(14) ppm (parts 
per million) in May 2012, up from 338.01 ppm at the time of independence 
in July 1978 and pre-industrial levels of 280 ppm. The implications for 
food security are myriad, and dire. Coral reefs, mangroves and forests are 
particularly vulnerable. “Major shifts in temperature and rainfall may result 
in the disappearance of fragile ecosystems in these areas and their associated 
biodiversity” (Pauku, 2009, p. 4). A particularly apocalyptic vision of climate 
change suggests “the global coral reef ecosystem - with its storehouse of 
(14) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
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biodiversity and fisheries supporting millions of the world’s poor - will cease to 
be” Bradbury (2012). The author goes on to state that “scientific evidence for 
this is compelling and unequivocal but there seems to be a collective reluctance 
to accept the logical conclusion - that there is no hope of saving the global coral 
reef ecosystem” (Bradbury). Regardless of whether this extremely pessimistic 
scenario will come to pass or if coral reefs “pushed outside their temperature-
acidity envelope” (Bradbury) might somehow turn out to be more resilient than 
we give them credit for does not mean a reprieve from a food insecure future. 
Pauku draws direct links between climate change and extreme weather events 
such as the 2004 drought that caused severe food shortages in Temotu and 
the 2004 Category 5 cyclone that devastated the Polynesian outlier of Tikopia 
(Pauku, 2009, p. 4). While sea level rise and the spectre of whole island states 
disappearing beneath the waves loom largest in the popular imagination, long 
before this occurs changing weather will “increase vulnerability and pose a 
threat to food security as well as the health and survival of the Solomon Islands’ 
biodiversity resources” (Pauku, 2009, p. 4). Cohen and Ross assert, meanwhile, 
that “climactic change has the potential to prevent Marovo households from 
accessing sufficient food in multiple ways. Increased rainfall has been noted 
as causing root crops to rot in the ground and also discouraging people from 
travelling to their gardens to harvest fresh produce, relying instead on store 
bought foods” (Cohen & Ross in Albert et al. 2010, p. 85). Identifying local 
impacts on Vangunu Island the authors note incidents of “salt water intrusion… 
killing coconut trees and other fruit trees” around Michi village. At face value 
these events support a hypothesis of sea-level rise, however the authors concede: 
“active tectonics in the region, and the possible subsidence of Vangunu Island, 
as well as the complete absence of any long-term datasets that measure absolute 
sea level rise, it is hard to directly link changes in sea level to global warming 
induced sea level rise” (Cohen & Ross in Albert et al. 2010, p. 85). Instead they 
posit localised processes “causing saltwater intrusion and coastal inundation as 
‘relative sea level rise’” while noting “a Marovo-wide feeling that the climate 
and climatic seasons that regulate Marovo lifestyles and subsistence activities 
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are changing… becoming less predictable” (Cohen & Ross in Albert et al. 2010, 
p. 83).
In September 2008 the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) tabled 
resolution (A/62/L50) calling on the UN Security Council to address climate 
change as an urgent threat to international peace and security. Resolution 
63/281‘Climate change and its possible security implications’ was subsequently 
adopted by the General Assembly on June 11, 2009 but to date little has 
changed. Major emitters have yet to implement meaningful Greenhouse Gas 
reductions sufficient to avoid a disastrous and food insecure future for Pacific 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
IX. Conclusion
This paper highlights but a few of the failures of the state to ensure food 
security while exposing self-interest and in-built bias of ODA and FDI as 
experienced in Solomon Islands. In the case of the latter there exists evidence of 
decades of exploitation consistent with structural violence (Galtung 1971). 
In Honiara meanwhile urban poverty and interrelated noncommunicable 
diseases caused by food insecurity and poor quality convenience foods provide 
evidence of misplaced priorities on the part of the state and profiteering trading 
partners. The preventable food-related diseases condemn Solomon Islands 
children in particular to a lifetime of physical and cognitive impairment, 
negatively impacting their quality of life as well as their communities’ social and 
economic potential.  
By comparison the relative abundance of Nggatokae’s marine and terrestrial 
environments provides a measure of food security but demands hard work 
and careful stewardship in return. The people of Biche Village in particular 
are fortunate that their Traditional Knowledge and biodiversity remain largely 
intact, while customary law ensures a high-degree of local control over 
resources. The unresolved question is whether efforts to build agrobiodiversity 
and resilience into ‘Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems’ (FAO, 
2008) and conserving reef biodiversity through community managed marine 
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protected areas will prove sufficient to withstand compounding anthropogenic 
macro-disturbances such as climate change, ocean-acidification and depletion of 
major fish stocks. Current trends suggest sophisticated agriculture and fisheries 
systems that have allowed islanders to thrive in challenging environments over 
millennia will become increasingly stressed with severe implications for food 
security. 
Meanwhile the legal but ethically dubious practise of patenting Pacific food 
crops by outside actors combined with exploitative practises by foreign logging 
companies rob Solomon Islanders of economic potential that is increasingly 
critical if they are to derive sufficient revenues to ensure long-term food security. 
Forest degradation, meanwhile, threatens to prevent islanders from eventually 
benefiting from Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) and REDD+ schemes.
Future scholarship, as a matter of urgency, needs to examine critical links 
between TEK, agrobiodiversity and resilience in both the local and global 
context if Solomon Islanders and others are to avoid the catastrophic predictions 
of authors such as Bradbury (2012). A significant portion of ODA must also 
be diverted from expat salaries to investments in local capacity, in particular 
tertiary education that will allow Solomon Islanders to increasingly fill the roles 
of technical experts, while improving governance and strengthening their hand 
in the face of coercive trade and investment pressure by larger economic powers.
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Food Insecurity: Structural Violence in Solomon Islands?
<Summary>
Glenn Raynor
This article examines the ways in which food insecurity in Solomon 
Islands stems from a combination of external forces that perpetuate poverty, 
inequality and a paradigm of structural violence by turning this culturally and 
biodiversity rich archipelago into a conflict plagued fragile state. The article 
combines empirical research in Biche Village, Marovo Lagoon with a survey of 
regionally and thematically pertinent scholarly and development sector literature 
to establish causal links between food insecurity and pervasive iterations of 
colonialism. In the concluding section, author argues that future scholarship, 
as a matter of urgency, needs to examine critical links between TEK, 
agrobiodiversity and resilience in both the local and global context if Solomon 
Islanders and others are to avoid the catastrophic predictions of authors such as 
Bradbury (2012). 

